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Pearls, Pith, and Provocation
The complex and subtle nature of qualitative inquiry is at 
least partly caused by the unavoidable presence of the 
researcher within and through the research (Holloway & 
Biley, 2011). Qualitative health research, in particular, 
often tackles subjects infused with powerful and some-
times distressing emotions resulting from the experience of 
illness and the provision of care (Morse, 2010). Reflexivity 
has emerged as an important means of responding to this 
complexity, helping researchers to sustain positions of 
thoughtful self-awareness (Holloway & Biley; Woodby, 
Williams, Wittich, & Burgio, 2011). It is thus a concept 
with which qualitative health researchers must engage, 
despite current literature revealing it to be deceptively 
intricate. The optimal approach of the researcher is held to 
be a delicate balance of employing self-knowledge without 
becoming “overemotional or self-absorbed” (Holloway & 
Biley, p. 968), yet the mechanisms of exactly how to 
accomplish this balance are not well understood.
In this article I draw on psychoanalytic theories of 
how individuals make sense of the social world, and how 
they make sense of themselves and others, to trouble 
some of the assumptions underpinning current approaches 
to reflexivity. Explicating the details of how the capacity 
to think evolves (Bion, 1962) helps to uncover the opera-
tionalization of reflexivity and the kinds of events, cir-
cumstances, and characteristics that might influence it. I 
explore how these ideas illuminate reflexivity in qualita-
tive health research, with an example of muddled distinc-
tions between self and other as well as an example of 
momentary failure of reflexivity in research interviewing. 
I conclude with acknowledgment of unresolved tensions 
accompanying the use of psychoanalytic theories for 
research purposes and argue that despite these, the ideas 
presented here reveal particular points of intervention for 
researchers seeking a reflexive way of working.
Capturing Reflexivity
Essence and Complexity
Trying to capture the essence of reflexivity reveals a 
complexity less to do with collecting pithy definitions, of 
which there are many thoughtful and articulate examples, 
and more to do with grasping a formulation that seems to 
change shape considerably as it moves across disciplines 
and schools of thought. Definitions are inevitably colored 
by the context within which and for which they are writ-
ten, resulting in a spectrum of descriptions incorporating 
more or less sociological, philosophical, and/or research-
related dimensions.
Of the major thinkers who developed theories and appli-
cations of reflexivity, three in particular serve to illustrate 
the key differences in approach. Pierre Bourdieu favored it 
as a way of guarding against complacent reproduction of 
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Abstract
Reflexivity is fundamental to qualitative health research, yet notoriously difficult to unpack. Drawing on Wilfred 
Bion’s work on the development of the capacity to think and to learn, I show how the capacity to think is an 
impermanent and fallible capacity, with the potential to materialize or evaporate at any number of different points. 
I use this conceptualization together with examples from published interview data to illustrate the difficulties for 
researchers attempting to sustain a reflexive approach, and to direct attention toward the possibilities for recovering 
and supporting the capacity to think. I counter some of the criticisms suggesting that reflexivity can be self-indulgent, 
and suggest instead that self-indulgence constitutes a failure of reflexivity. In the concluding discussions I acknowledge 
tensions accompanying the use of psychoanalytic theories for research purposes, and point to emerging psychosocial 
approaches as one way of negotiating these.
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scholars’ pet concerns and ideas (Deer, 2008). Anthony 
Giddens problematized reflexivity as a consequence of 
modern society and suggested that the constant flow of 
new information and knowledge creates a kind of collec-
tive, perpetual revisioning of social life (Giddens, 1991). 
George Herbert Mead, father of symbolic interactionism, 
considered reflexivity a capacity for self-consciousness 
and thus the core of human nature (Bond & Bond, 1986). 
These are only snapshots of substantial and significant 
bodies of work, but they show how reflexivity has been 
conceptualized as a methodological issue for research, a 
collective activity, and an individual capacity.
More recent writers have continued this pattern of 
conceptualization, with little consensus. Reflexivity has 
been cast as “arguably a characteristic of all conscious 
beings, the ability to take oneself as an object of knowl-
edge, or ‘reflection’” (Benton & Craib, 2001, p. 185); or, 
alternatively, “the regular exercise of the mental ability, 
shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in 
relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 
2007, p. 4). There is clear disagreement here about 
whether all or only some people are able to be reflexive. 
Moreover, Bryman (2008) located reflexivity firmly in 
the world of social research when he defined it as “reflec-
tiveness among social researchers about the implications 
for the knowledge of the social world they generate of 
their methods, values, biases, decisions, and mere pres-
ence in the very situations they investigate” (p. 698). This 
view has echoes of Bourdieu’s contention that reflexivity 
is deployed in a qualitatively different and more sophisti-
cated way by researchers (Deer, 2008; Gray, 2008).
Tracing the effects of these differences prompts ques-
tions not only about the nature and purpose of reflexivity 
but also about its evolution and development. Whether it 
is painted as a universally inherent characteristic or as a 
specialized technique has implications for how (and if) it 
can be learned, refined, and applied. The extent to which 
reflexivity is understood as an emotionalized process has, 
on occasion, led to consternation about how best to repre-
sent emotional issues in academic writing (Holmes, 
2010), and even a warning against “fetishizing reflexivity 
as a magic tool that can render theoretical reflection 
redundant” (Karakayali, 2004, p. 361).
Development of symbolic interactionist ideas has been 
proposed as a fruitful way of addressing these issues 
(Holmes, 2010), and indeed the focus on how self and 
others construct meaning through interaction has long 
informed approaches to reflexivity in research (Charmaz, 
1999, 2011). Drawing more extensively on ideas of emo-
tion as a product of relationships and interactions has 
been suggested (Holmes, 2010), but limitations with this 
approach remain because of the difficulty locating and 
attending to individual, intrapersonal processes within a 
symbolic interactionist framework (Archer, 2003).
Questions about how to be reflexive or how to practice 
reflexivity persist (Holmes, 2010; Karakayali, 2004; Riach, 
2009), and this is the primary focus of this article. These 
questions are perhaps most clearly articulated by Archer, 
who stated that there is a need to be “a good deal more 
precise about the agential processes involved” (2003, p. 9). 
In this article I show how psychoanalytic ideas implicate 
thinking, as defined here, as the central agential process 
involved. I suggest thinking, as defined here, is the means 
by which reflexivity is accomplished and that the capacity 
to think, as defined here, is a prerequisite.
Locating Wilfred Bion
A detailed account of the remarkably diverse range of 
schools of psychoanalysis and their variations and vicissi-
tudes is beyond the scope of this article; however, it is 
helpful to at least situate Wilfred Bion’s (1897–1979) work 
and the associated positions of the relational psychoana-
lytic theories that constitute the bedrock of the ideas here. 
Relational approaches have a “democratic, co-created 
view” (Orbach, 2008, p. 27) that steer away from a reduc-
tive focus on intrapsychic phenomena at the expense of 
recognizing the impact of social and cultural experiences 
(Layton, 2008). These acknowledgments of external influ-
ences and the coproduced nature of dynamics in relation-
ships entail a commitment to the social and societal as well 
as to the intrapsychic (Hollway, 2008). The roots of the 
relational stance extend down a long list of psychoanalytic 
theorists who shared interest in some or other of these 
dimensions, of which Bion was only one (Orbach).
Together with Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, and 
John Bowlby, Bion was one of the major figures in the psy-
choanalytic field in the postwar period (Holmes, 1993). He 
focused on parent–infant relationships and the develop-
ment of the capacity to think and to learn (Bion, 1962), as 
well as on psychoanalytic theories of the ways groups of 
people function when they are together (Bion, 1961). It is 
his work on the development of the capacity to think and to 
learn that is of key interest to the rethinking of reflexivity 
here. To understand the origins of thinking, Bion (1962) 
returned to the earliest development of this capacity, as it 
emerges between parent and baby. Brown commented that 
“Bion’s contribution is how the infant, in collaboration 
with his mother,1 comes to know reality, gives emotional 
meaning to his experiences and learns from those experi-
ences” (2011, p. 85). Bion (1962) examined the details of 
this process of making sense of the world through the rela-
tionship between self and other, and showed that acquiring 
the capacity to think is a process shaped by the quality and 
nature of experiences as well as individual ability.
The capacity to think emerges as “a developmental 
achievement, uncertain and reversible” (Alexandrov, 2009, 
p. 40), and this indicates the potential for it to be facilitated 
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or hampered, not just during infancy but also at any num-
ber of other points throughout life. In the remainder of this 
article I explore this impermanent and fallible nature of the 
capacity to think, and the corresponding questions about 
how best to sustain reflexivity in research practices.
Developing the Capacity to Think
Researcher reflexivity is now considered central to the 
process of qualitative research (Bryman, 2008; Finlay, 
2002; Holloway & Biley, 2011), but there is a wide range 
of formulations in use, as indicated in the opening sections 
of this article. It is commonplace to state that the values 
and experiences of researchers have the potential to influ-
ence what they see and understand. Despite this assertion, 
much less attention is paid to the detail of exactly how 
experiences shape views, and thus exactly how reflexivity 
might provide some redress. I suggest that using a psycho-
analytic framework of early social development allows 
researchers to consider the detail of how thinking evolves, 
the complex difficulties of sustaining a capacity to think 
and, consequently, of sustaining a reflexive approach.
Although reflexivity is normally associated with lan-
guage, the processes of making sense of self, other, and 
the social world begin much earlier (Reid, 1997). 
Observation of babies and parents confirms that despite 
an absence of language, babies can be adept at engaging 
their parents’ attention and have ways of communicating 
their needs (Reid). These observations also indicate that 
parents can be adept at receiving and understanding these 
communications, and can in turn communicate with their 
babies and respond to and meet their needs (Waddell, 
2002). Bion (1962) understood the mechanisms of these 
communications by extending the concept of “projective 
identification” first identified by psychoanalyst Melanie 
Klein (Segal, 1979).
Bion suggested that projective identification is “an 
early form of that which later is called a capacity for 
thinking” (1962, p. 37). For example, Bion (1962) pro-
posed that when a baby is overwhelmed and cannot make 
sense of powerful experiences such as pain, fear, or hun-
ger, he or she projects these experiences into the parent so 
that the parent is able to feel something of them and 
understand the baby’s experience. As the parent experi-
ences (a diluted version of) the baby’s distress, he or she 
employs a capacity to think about it and then manages it 
for the baby by providing the attention or comfort 
required. This process is accomplished by means of what 
Bion called “reverie” (1962, p. 36), the essence of which 
is a mind that is open and thoughtful, and able to take in 
these kinds of experiences from the baby. In this way, the 
baby begins to learn that experiences can be tolerated, 
thought about, and addressed, and gradually assumes the 
ability to do this more independently (Waddell, 2002).
These early experiences shape the individual’s sense 
of self, and help to frame ways of relating to others and 
the wider social world. A representation of the world is 
formed that can be reworked and modified according to 
subsequent experiences, but that over time is likely to 
become a kind of template for interpersonal engagement. 
In simple terms, self might be construed as interesting, 
lovable, unpleasant, or boring; the world might be under-
stood as frightening, unpredictable, interesting, or benign; 
and others might be seen as helpful, absent, or threatening 
(Waddell, 2002). This perspective can be understood as 
something like Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Maton, 
2008, p. 50), which refers to the tendencies and disposi-
tions that repeatedly shape perceptions and interactions. 
Despite the obvious parallels, contemporary psychoana-
lytic theories take a more optimistic view of individual 
potential for agency, and hold that even with disadvanta-
geous early experiences, individuals retain the potential 
to make use of “good enough” (Winnicott, 1989, p. 456) 
experiences, then revise the template and thereby enjoy 
more rewarding relations between self, other, and the 
social world.
Canham captured the enormous importance of this pro-
cess perfectly when he commented, “Being able to think 
and to learn has its roots, therefore, in a meeting of minds 
between mother and baby” (2006, p. 15). Bion used the 
term container (1962, p. 90) to denote the parent’s mind 
and its containing function as it holds the baby’s intolera-
ble experiences before thinking about and helping to pro-
cess and make sense of them. These early exchanges have 
resonance in adulthood in two ways. First, they prepare 
the individual to sustain curiosity and retain thoughtful-
ness, even when feelings of discomfort or bewilderment 
threaten to overwhelm (Canham, 2006). Conversely, in 
the event that there is a failure of the capacity to think, the 
opportunity for authentic understanding of the social 
world is significantly diminished because only that which 
is comfortable, tolerable, and immediately manageable 
can be known, and that which unsettles cannot be consid-
ered (Canham).
Second, in the face of difficult or unsettling feelings or 
experiences, individuals of any age can potentially retrace 
their steps to patterns of early communication (Waddell, 
2002). In psychoanalytic terms, states of mind refer to 
complex emotional attitudes or “positions from which 
life and relationships are experienced” (Waddell, 2002, 
p. 6). Some particular states of mind can be more strongly 
associated with specific age groups or developmental 
stages than others, but can also be found more temporar-
ily in any individual. For example, a frightened “baby 
self” state of mind might be present in an adult (Waddell). 
States of mind can fluctuate even within a single interac-
tion, and can be influenced by interpersonal and intraper-
sonal factors (Waddell).
4  Qualitative Health Research XX(X)
What is of key interest is the possibility of a thinking 
state of mind, which is essentially a “capacity genuinely 
to take things in, and to use them to develop a truer pic-
ture of the-self-in-the-world” (Waddell, 2002, p. 118). It 
is then feasible to raise questions about states of mind in 
which thinking is not possible, and authentic contact with 
the cause of the discomfort is limited or even eliminated 
to protect and defend against that discomfort (Salzberger-
Wittenberg, Williams, & Osborne, 1983).
This supposition has clear implications for all sorts of 
situations and consequently, the notion of a “containing” 
relationship has evolved into many different arenas. It is 
often used to describe a relationship that provides the kind 
of thinking space that enables development and growth. 
For example, academic supervisors might provide contain-
ment for students as they bring not-quite-formed ideas, 
sharing dilemmas of not knowing, and opening up new 
directions of argument. In this way they help students to 
manage the discomfort associated with not knowing and 
therefore encourage sufficient openness and confidence to 
learn anew (Salzberger-Wittenberg et al., 1983). Qualitative 
health researchers might provide containment for research 
participants as they hesitate to articulate their experiences, 
tolerating the discomfort of uncertainty and keeping open 
minds to allow the unexpected. Talking about issues such 
as the experience of illness can be harrowing, and contain-
ment supports meaningful recognition and understanding 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).
Intersubjectivity and Coconstruction
The capacity to think, as it is conceptualized here, is not 
only a function of self but emerges from the relationship 
between both participants (Bion, 1962). Understanding 
projective identification as a means of communication 
recognizes that both parties experience the impact of 
being part of a thinking couple, and that both impart 
changes that become part of and shape the evolving inter-
action (Bion, 1962). Intersubjectivity mirrors very closely 
Bion’s (1962) development of projective identification, 
and can be described as “how the two minds affect, probe, 
come to know each other, and, through that exchange, 
create new meaning and/or uncover previously con-
structed meanings” (Brown, 2011, p. 109). This definition 
refers to the psychoanalytic setting, but the words apply 
equally to the practice of qualitative inquiry, which, simi-
larly, seeks understanding of the human experience.
This sharing of experience between self and other has 
also been characterized as “reflexive embodied empathy” 
(Finlay, 2005, p. 271) in a compelling account of the 
researcher perceiving and feeling the felt experiences of 
the research participant during interviews and observa-
tions. The researcher attempts to use these experiences as 
a source of information to better understand the data 
collected (Finlay, 2005). It is important to recognize that 
the very notion of intersubjectivity highlights that research 
participants can also feel the felt experience of the 
researcher. If both are “perpetually undergoing some 
degree of reorganization as [they] are affected by the 
unconscious communications” (Brown, 2011, p. 9), it is 
difficult to see where self ends and other begins. This has 
the potential to become muddled and blurred, and Finlay 
seemed to confirm this when she concluded, “When I 
merged with Jenny, was it Jenny I saw or was it myself? 
Perhaps, in the end, intersubjectivity demands that 
empathic revelation of an Other and reflexive uncovering 
of self are inseparable” (2005, p. 289).
I argue that, drawing on the contemporary psychoana-
lytic theories presented here, the capacity to think emerges 
as the prerequisite condition for attending to the difficulty 
illustrated above. In Bion’s (1962) account of projective 
identification between parent and baby, it is the mobiliza-
tion of the capacity to think that enables the parent to 
surmise that it is the baby (other) who is hungry and 
distressed and not the parent (self). Positing the capacity 
to think in this way serves as a kind of “freeze frame” 
function, encouraging a focus on the moment-to-moment 
details of the interaction. Consequently, the reflexive 
ability to share the feeling is revealed to be essential but 
not enough. It must be accompanied by the capacity to 
think, so that the experience can be thought about.
Rethinking Reflexivity
A Thinking State of Mind
In light of the theories presented, I argue that the concept 
of reflexivity is irrevocably connected with thinking, and 
with the capacity to think as it is defined here. If the uncon-
scious, preverbal, and intersubjective dimensions of Bion’s 
(1962) theory of thinking are accepted, the notion of 
reflexivity as “internal conversation” (Archer, 2007, p. 3) 
is rendered unhelpfully simplistic and perhaps even mis-
leading. Instead, it becomes possible to formulate a con-
cept of reflexivity as both a quality or state of mind and, 
simultaneously, a practice in which to actively engage.
The practice of reflexivity could be construed as inten-
tional and perhaps a matter of choice, although arguably, 
accepting the presence of unconscious and intersubjec-
tive processes troubles this somewhat. Furthermore, the 
idea that the practice of reflexivity needs a thinking state 
of mind in which to operate challenges the notion that it 
is possible to decide to be reflexive and then simply do it. 
Theorizing reflexivity from this perspective raises further 
questions about what kinds of events, circumstances, and 
characteristics provide optimal conditions. These and the 
implications for researchers are considered in the follow-
ing sections.
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Reflexivity for Qualitative Health Research
Researcher reflexivity, then, is inevitably woven through 
the ontological and epistemological framework of the 
research, as well as being alive in the moment-to-moment 
interactions between researchers and research participants. 
The theoretical implications of reflexivity raise questions, 
not only about the extent to which researchers can employ 
a genuine capacity to think, but also about the extent to 
which research participants also employ this capacity. 
Operationalizing reflexivity in any given research project 
requires attention to the combined effects of all of these 
interrelated features.
Currently, one approach to addressing this challenge is 
for researchers to document something of their own per-
spectives, interests, and position so that readers might 
evaluate for themselves the potential for bias (Finlay, 
2002). Although disclosing this information can help to 
identify significant conflicts of interest, such as pressure 
for research findings to meet the expectations of funding 
organizations, it is arguably less effective at unpacking 
more subtle phenomena. I suggest this approach is prob-
lematic because of its inherent assumptions that the 
researcher can employ the capacity to think as defined 
here, and that the researcher need only articulate the rich 
knowledge of self already possessed.
It is less common to problematize research participants’ 
perspectives in this way, yet if the intersubjective nature of 
reflexivity is accepted, it follows that research participants 
play a key role. In practice, this might mean researchers 
adopt an epistemological stance that privileges collaborative 
approaches to the collection and analysis of data to cocon-
struct the research narrative (Jancowski, Clark, & Ivey, 
2000; Underwood, Satterthwaite, & Bartlett, 2010). It also 
means resisting the assumption that research participants 
can employ the capacity to think as defined here, and as 
before, that rich self-knowledge is already possessed. Both 
Wengraf (2001), and Hollway and Jefferson (2000) have 
cautioned that naïve acceptance of participants’ responses is 
fraught with difficulty, for exactly these reasons.
Reflexivity is often posited as a means of ameliorat-
ing the tendency for power to be weighted in favor of the 
researcher (see, for example, Benton & Craib, 2001; 
Jankowski et al., 2000; Kelly, 2010), although Enosh and 
Buchbinder (2005) sounded an interesting note of cau-
tion and suggested that this weighting is by no means 
inevitable and is perhaps likely to fluctuate, for example, 
even throughout the course of one interview. Their view 
highlights the importance of moment-to-moment inter-
actions, and is aptly illustrated by the following extract 
from their study of narrative construction in qualitative 
interviews. The researcher asked the questions (Q), with 
answers (A) given by the research participant (Enosh & 
Buchbinder, 2005, p. 594):
Q: What do you do if [x] happens?
A: It almost never happens.
Q: And if it does happen?
A: Then no.
Q: It must have happened.
A: It’s rare, very rare.
Q: So let’s remember a time it did happen, what 
did you do?
A: I didn’t do anything.
Enosh and Buchbinder (2005) detailed the way that 
both researcher and research participant were utterly 
committed to their own version of reality, and also the 
way that both contributed to the style of the interaction, 
which they characterized as a power struggle. I would 
add that this is a striking example of an absence of any 
thinking state of mind, and that, consequently, reflexivity 
in this moment-to-moment interaction was impossible. It 
does not follow that this researcher is always incapable of 
employing a thinking state of mind, nor that he or she 
eschews a reflexive approach to research. Similarly, it 
does not follow that this research participant is always 
incapable of employing a thinking state of mind. This 
example also illustrates the question of unconscious and 
conscious dimensions of reflexivity. It is entirely possi-
ble, and perhaps likely, that the researcher embarked on 
this interview intending a reflexive approach. Arguably, 
whatever derailed this interaction lay beyond immediate 
conscious awareness, and is therefore not accessible for 
consideration.
Recognizing that states of mind can fluctuate opens 
windows of opportunity to facilitate shifts in the interac-
tion such that the capacity to think is regained. In the 
extract above, a sensitive and attuned state of mind might 
have been able to genuinely take in the information 
communicated from the other instead of doggedly 
returning information from self, which in turn could 
not be received. Alternatively, an ability to perceive 
any attendant discomfort or incomprehension might give 
enough space and time to stimulate curiosity about the 
interaction. Note that the first option requires an authen-
tic contact with other, whereas the second requires an 
authentic contact with self. It is not necessary that either 
participant knows immediately how to resolve the diffi-
culty, only that there is a willingness to recognize the 
difficulty and to tolerate it long enough to learn more. In 
the inimitable words of Waddell, “Creative thought may 
be undermined by the stirring of feelings of inferiority 
and defensiveness, by the push towards certainty which 
obscures further penetration into the area of the 
unknown” (2002, p. 117). If reflexivity is to be part of 
research, it must be alive in moment-to-moment interac-
tions like these as well as in the overarching philosophy 
and design of the project.
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Reflexivity: A Double-Edged Sword?
Reflexivity is generally presented as something of a 
double-edged sword, with even enthusiastic devotees 
conveying strongly worded warnings. Finlay, in particu-
lar, expressed concern at the dangers of “endless narcis-
sistic personal emoting, or interminable deconstructions 
of deconstructions” (2002, p. 226). Holloway and Biley 
echoed this, reflecting, “Research is not therapy” 
(2011, p. 974). There have been accusations of “self-
indulgence” (Bishop & Shepherd, 2011, p. 1283), and 
Potvin, Bissett, and Walz (2010) also cautioned that 
reflexivity can overemphasize the researcher’s experi-
ences and thereby risk eclipsing the experiences of the 
research participant.
I suggest these supposed challenges of reflexivity are 
more appropriately reframed as failures of reflexivity in 
light of the ideas presented in this article. In brief, reflex-
ivity is essentially an intersubjective process operational-
ized in the context of a thinking state of mind, and the 
thinking state of mind means having a “capacity genu-
inely to take things in, and to use them to develop a truer 
picture of the-self-in-the-world” (Waddell, 2002, p. 118). 
This surely requires that the researcher maintain aware-
ness of the context, purpose, and focus of the research, 
which should mitigate risks of excessive focus on self. It 
also emphasizes the need for thinking about, rather than 
simply revealing, aspects of self. Consequently, I argue 
that lengthy disclosures that fail to demonstrate applica-
ble links to the research project have missed the point.
Dilemmas and Tensions
The relatively unexplored schools of psychoanalytic theory 
hold considerable potential for interdisciplinary applica-
tion, but at the same time their unfamiliarity is problematic. 
Although there are shared interests in understanding the 
negotiation of relations between self, other, and the social 
world, ontological and epistemological tensions remain. 
Perhaps this is at least in part because “the practice of psy-
choanalysis has not necessitated that clinical psychoana-
lysts intervene directly in ontological questioning, whether 
implicitly or explicitly” (Clemens, 2007, p. 185). As a 
result, uncertainty about philosophical foundations remains, 
with psychoanalytic theories variously recognized as hav-
ing positivist overtones (Billig, 1999) or constructivist 
leanings (Benton & Craib, 2001).
The role of the unconscious and its influences on 
researcher reflexivity is another area that would benefit 
from further consideration, particularly with a view to 
exploring how researchers might develop skills in bringing 
unconscious aspects into conscious awareness. It is patently 
unrealistic to suggest that all qualitative researchers engage 
in extended psychoanalytic treatment, yet finding ways of 
drawing on this rich and diverse body of work to enhance 
researchers’ awareness of themselves and the impact they 
have on the social world need not require such extensive 
input. Some researchers are already working with psycho-
analytic theories to deepen understanding of human experi-
ence, using a psychosocial approach to research (Hollway, 
2008). Clarke and Hoggett (2009) have gathered together 
emerging methods and methodologies used in a range of 
research projects, and proposed psychoanalysis as a disci-
pline ideally suited to further exploration of reflexivity in 
research practice.
Jervis (2009), in particular, highlighted the parallels 
between research interactions and clinical psychoanalyti-
cal interactions, and detailed her own experiences of find-
ing that her defensive processes blocked her capacity to 
think about and engage with interview data. Although she 
acknowledged that personal psychoanalytic treatment 
can prove advantageous, she also showed that it is not the 
only way to turn a critical lens and “thinking” mind to 
one’s own part in shaping research (Jervis).
Conclusion
Undertaking qualitative health research requires thought-
ful engagement with the concept of reflexivity, yet it 
remains an elusive and slippery gathering of sometimes 
disparate and contradictory ideas. Contemporary psycho-
analytic theories have been used here to conceptualize 
reflexivity as both a state of mind and a practice. More 
specifically, reflexivity is defined as an essentially inter-
subjective process operationalized in the context of a 
thinking state of mind. Theorizing from this perspective 
shows how the skills and abilities most likely to facilitate 
reflexivity can evaporate or materialize in response to 
events, circumstances, and characteristics.
Recognizing these essential dimensions reveals the 
different points of intervention for researchers seeking a 
reflexive way of working. Sensitivity to experiences of 
both self and other, capacity to tolerate uncertainty, and 
openness to the unexpected are examples of factors that 
help sustain a thinking state of mind. Attunement to 
nuances of communication, and appropriately tailored 
responses, potentiate the likelihood of authentic interac-
tions with the social world. Being clear about the context 
and aims of the process supports critical application to the 
particular research project. All of these are required, 
because although it is clear that emotional and personal 
experiences are part of reflexivity, it is also clear they are 
not sufficient. They must be thought about and analyzed, 
and the analysis used purposefully in the research pro-
cess. This means weaving reflexivity into the broader 
ontological and epistemological frame of the research as 
well as attending to the moment-to-moment interactions 
between the researcher and others.
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